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Abstract
Epidemiological explanation often has a “black box” character, meaning the
intermediate steps between cause and effect are unknown. Filling in black boxes is
thought to improve causal inferences by making them intelligible. I argue that adding
information about intermediate causes to a black box explanation is an unreliable
guide to pragmatic intelligibility because it may mislead us about the stability of a
cause. I diagnose a problem that I call wishful intelligibility, which occurs when
scientists misjudge the limitations of certain features of an explanation. Wishful
intelligibility gives us a new reason to prefer black box explanations in some contexts.
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1 Introduction
Epidemiological explanation often has a “black box” character, meaning the intermediate
steps between some putative cause and effect of interest are unknown. The black boxes of
epidemiological explanation have been variously described as mere predictive heuristics; as
obstacles, or even threats to scientific understanding. Philosophers and epidemiologists
alike have argued that specifying intermediate causes to fill in black boxes improves causal
explanations by making them intelligible, and better targets for public health intervention
(Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000; Hiatt 2004; Russo and Williamson 2007). Specifying
the links between the ends of a causal chain is supposed to confer certainty, understanding,
and reasons to expect a causal relationship to be stable or invariant across populations of
interest.
I argue that adding information about intermediate causes can be an unreliable guide
to improving epidemiological explanation because it may mislead us about the stability of
a causal relationship and may convey a false sense of understanding. I diagnose this as an
instance of a more general problem that I call wishful intelligibility, which occurs when
scientists misjudge the limits of the pragmatic benefit conferred by certain features of an
explanation. To illustrate this, I consider an example of epidemiological explanation
involving the social determinants of health. My argument offers a new reason to prefer
black box explanations in some contexts: not despite, but because of, their lack of
information about intermediate causes. This preference has the consequence that filling in
black boxes is not a necessary source of intelligibility, but a contingent one.
2 Black Boxes and Intelligibility
Specifying the links between the ends of a causal chain is supposed to improve our
understanding of an epidemiological cause, but attempts to account for the intelligibility
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produced by filling in black boxes vary considerably. For mechanists like Machamer,
Darden, and Craver (2000, 21), filling in intermediate links of a causal chain between some
cause C and effect E at the preferred level of detail for a given scientific field makes the
relationship between C and E more intelligible. This sense in which filling in black boxes is
supposed to confer understanding on this account is rather vague, leaving open the
possibility that their “intelligibility” is akin to the phenomenological “sense of
understanding” that Trout (2002) convincingly condemns as an unreliable indicator of
explanatory goodness. By contrast, other accounts of epidemiological explanation tether
the value of filling in black boxes to the goal, broadly speaking, of using epidemiological
explanations to design effective public health interventions (Russo and Williamson 2007;
Illari 2011; Broadbent 2011). Following de Regt (2017), I’ll call this pragmatic
intelligibility. I will focus on the pragmatic intelligibility argument, both because it seems
to evade the phenomenological critique and because it bears a more obvious relationship to
the design of public health policy.
One way that filling in black boxes is supposed to confer pragmatic intelligibility is by
informing our inferences about the stability of epidemiological causes; that is, our
expectation that a causal relationship observed in one context will also hold in other
contexts of interest. Because many epidemiological causal relationships are observed in
population studies, the design of effective public health interventions must often attend to
the potential efficacy of such interventions both within and beyond the original conditions
in which a causal relationship is observed (Dupre´ 1984). Russo and Williamson (2007)
famously argue that filling in black boxes supports epidemiological causal inference in just
this way: that filling in a black box with evidence of a plausible mechanism tells us about
the stability of a cause, and supports an expectation that the causal relationship will hold
in contexts of interest that differ from the one in which it was observed. This feature
would, if true, make such evidence key to the use of epidemiological causes with regard to
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the design of public health interventions. In section 3, I will show why this is not
necessarily what we ought to expect.
3 Stability and Intermediate Causes
I agree that stability is one of the most important features of epidemiological inference
relative to the goal of reliable public health intervention. However, I argue that filling in
black boxes can lead us to both under- and overestimate the stability of epidemiological
causes. In practice, this makes filling in black boxes an unreliable guide to the pragmatic
intelligibility of epidemiological explanation.
Because Russo and Williamson take the increase in stability of a cause to mean that it
is expected to hold in conditions different from the ones in which the original experiment
or observation took place, I take it that they have in mind something like Woodward’s
(2010) notion of the stability of causes. On this account, there is a causal relationship
between two variables C and E just in case some intervention on the value of C produces a
change in the value of E that proceeds only through the change in C (Woodward 2000).
Interventionist causal relationships are stable or invariant to the extent that they hold over
a more or less universal set of background conditions, making causal stability a matter of
degree (Woodward 2000, 2010). Although this account is particularly amenable to
epidemiological practice because a Woodward intervention need not be the result of
intentional human manipulation, one does not need to be an interventionist to appreciate
this notion of stability.
Filling in black boxes entails adding links in a causal chain. As Woodward (2010)
points out, however, for any causal chain, the set of background conditions or domain of
invariance over which the entire chain is stable is limited to the extent to which the
stability of all links in the chain overlaps. This means the chain is limited not only by the
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domain of the least stable link, but also by the parts of that domain of invariance that are
shared with the other links. Because intermediate causes constrain the stability of the
chain in this way, adding information about intermediate links cannot, by itself, increase
our confidence in the stability of the entire chain.
3.1 Underestimating Stability
With this account of stability in mind, a focus on filling in black boxes can mislead us about
the stability of a causal relationship in at least two ways. First, identifying a single causal
chain from C to E may be misleading with respect to the stability of a cause that produces
its effect by multiple independent pathways. As Mitchell (2002), Fehr (2004), Dupre´ (2013)
and Howick et al. (2013) argue, specifying a single set of intermediate steps between cause
and effect restricts our assessment of the relationship between C and E to one particular
causal chain, when in fact there may be several pathways from C to E. For instance, a
causal variable like socioeconomic status might cause cancer by way of its effects on stress,
nutrition, access to preventive care, and so on. Multiple pathways between a single cause
and effect may be stable over different background conditions. This means that filling in a
black box with a single causal chain can lead us to underestimate the stability of a causal
relationship by confining our expectation to a single, overly narrow domain of invariance.
3.2 Overestimating Stability
As Fehr (2004) points out, our interest in causal intermediates need not commit us to the
myopia of single mechanistic explanation. However, more sophisticated efforts to fill in
black boxes are still subject to a second set of concerns about stability: namely, that filling
in black boxes can lead us to overestimate the stability of a causal chain when we overlook
the challenges of integrating multiple indirect causes. This is because filling in a black box
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is often a process of what Mayo-Wilson (2014) calls “piecemeal causal inference.” The
intermediate steps between a cause and effect in epidemiology are frequently inferred in
independent research contexts. As Baetu (2014), Mayo-Wilson (2014), and others have
pointed out, integrating causal variables that are inferred in different research contexts
increases underdetermination and uncertainty about causation. This problem is
particularly pernicious and complex when it comes to assessing the stability of causal
chains in epidemiology.
At least three features of epidemiological practice contribute to this difficulty. First,
ethical constraints make it the case that many causal inferences in epidemiology cannot be
made on the basis of manipulations or interventions in human populations. This means
many links in a putative causal chain are thought to be stable with respect to humans on
the basis of extrapolation from animal models, or retrospective analyses of so-called natural
experiments. Extrapolation and inferences of external validity are inherently epistemically
risky business (cf. Reiss 2019). Second, causal variables within the same chain are often
measured and described with very different degrees of precision, and at different spatial
and temporal scales in different research contexts. Finally, scientists in different research
contexts often measure causal variables with respect to different background conditions of
interest. For instance, social epidemiologists (e.g. Krieger 2008) are especially concerned to
include possible social determinants of health, like socioeconomic status, as variables in
their analyses, but other researchers interested in intermediate causes of the same effects,
like epigeneticists, may not measure the socioeconomic status of their subjects at all. Even
similar variables described and measured at similar scales are not consistently accounted
for across studies in the same field. For example, “neighborhood” is variously measured by
zip code, census tract, or county (Shavers 2007). When researchers want to integrate causal
inferences to fill in a black box between, for instance, neighborhood and cancer mortality,
these differences limit the extent to which piecemeal causal inference can tell us a causal
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relationship is stable with regard to the values of these differently described variables.
These failures to consistently define and co-measure background condition variables are a
problem because they mean that inferences about whether links are stable with regard to
the same background conditions may be much less certain than they appear.
When a black box causal relationship is filled in using intermediate causal inferences
assembled from diverse research contexts, it presents a unique challenge for assessing the
stability of the original causal relationship of interest. Because links in the same causal
chain are often inconsistently described, measured at different scales, and demonstrated
with respect to different background conditions, it is often impossible (or at least
intractable) to assess the extent to which multiple links in a causal chain share a domain of
invariance at all. Integrative inferences about the stability of the entire chain become much
more complex. At a minimum, these factors make it difficult to identify a lowest common
denominator, or least stable link in a causal chain. Failure to attend to these features of
piecemeal causal inference can lead us to overestimate the stability of a causal relationship
or to make an inference about its stability that is not justified by the available evidence.
3.3 Wishful Intelligibility
Since filling in black boxes is at best an unreliable guide to stability, and stability is critical
to the goal of designing epidemiological interventions, it follows that we should not expect
filling in black boxes to confer pragmatic benefit to epidemiological causes by way of
improving our inferences about stability in all contexts. Instead, this assumption may lead
us to be inappropriately confident in our understanding of a cause and in our estimation of
stability in particular. We should not expect filling in black boxes to be conducive to the
goals of epidemiological inference in cases where such goals depend on information about
the stability of a cause; this is a contingent, rather than a necessary, source of pragmatic
intelligibility.
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To mischaracterize the intelligibility of a causal claim is to misjudge the extent to which
we understand it. This may (mis)inform the design of interventions, with serious
consequences for public health policy. Unjustified attributions of pragmatic intelligibility
constitute a special kind of second-order misunderstanding; namely, a failure to correctly
assess the extent of the pragmatic benefit of some particular feature of an explanation
(Steel 2016; cf. Trout 2002). I call this wishful intelligibility. An unqualified preference for
filling in black boxes in pursuit of stability can lead us to wishful intelligibility (for a
similar argument, see Broadbent 2011).
Wishful intelligibility has an obvious affinity with the more general problem of wishful
thinking in the literature on science and values. Broadly speaking, wishful thinking may
occur when certain values or cognitive biases lead us to form an otherwise unjustified or
ill-justified belief; these biases may include but are not limited to a desire for the belief to
be true (see Anderson 2004; Steel 2018). By contrast, wishful intelligibility concerns not
whether a belief or claim is justified in general, but rather, whether we have good reason to
expect that some feature of an explanation is conducive to its use in a specific context.
That is, it concerns a particular set of beliefs: those about the pragmatic intelligibility
conferred by certain features of an explanation.
4 Multilevel Causes of Cancer
In section 3, I argued that filling in black boxes with intermediate causes can be misleading
with respect to the stability of a causal relationship, and that filling in black boxes can be
conducive to wishful intelligibility with regard to epidemiological explanation. Gehlert and
colleagues’ (2008) multilevel model of the social environment as a cause of cancer, from the
University of Chicago’s Center for Interdisciplinary Health Disparities Research (CIHDR),
shows the difficulty of estimating the stability of a piecemeal causal inference. Their work
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is particularly interesting because it purports to have implications for the design of future
public health interventions.
4.1 The Social Environment and Breast Cancer
This multilevel model fills in links in a (putative) causal chain by assembling multiple local
causal inferences from separate studies. A CIHDR study evaluates the social environment
of black women newly diagnosed with breast cancer in “predominantly black
neighborhoods of Chicago,” using interviews and “publicly available data geocoded to the
women’s addresses” (2008, 343). Gehlert et al. (2008, 344) argue that features of the built
environment, such as dilapidated housing and crime, contribute to social isolation. One
example cited, Sampson et al. (1997) is an investigation of the effects of “collective
efficacy” (defined as neighborhood social cohesion) on violence in Chicago in 1995.
The next steps in the chain are the sequential links between social isolation,
psychological states, and stress hormone responses. Here Gehlert et al. appeal to a
combination of human and rodent studies to argue that social isolation affects HPA axis
regulation and glucocorticoid (stress hormone) signaling via epigenetics. Since
glucocorticoid levels have been linked to suppressed immune function elsewhere in the
literature, the authors conclude that stress hormone regulation constitutes a means by
which social isolation can “get under the skin” to cause cancer and promote tumor cell
survival (2008, 343).
This model is a clear case where piecemeal assembly of links between “levels” does not
(by itself) support any inference about the stability of the whole chain. Importantly, each
step is inferred with respect to different background variables, and few, if any, of the same
background conditions are measured for any two links in the chain. Some links, like the
association between social isolation and mammary gland tumors, are manipulated in a
laboratory environment, using model organisms, while others are observed in humans.
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Qualitatively similar links in the chain are differently described: Sampson and colleagues’
study of collective efficacy is performed in the same Chicago neighborhoods as the CIHDR
study of newly diagnosed cancer patients, but using a notion of “neighborhood clusters” to
combine 847 census tracts into 343 clusters, from more than a decade earlier. Setting aside
the fact that these neighborhoods have probably changed over ten years, the extent to
which these neighborhood clusters overlap spatially with the geocoded data used to
measure neighborhoods in the CIHDR project is unclear. Some links, such as epigenetic
regulation of altered HPA axis-related gene expression, are apparently assumed to be stable
across human populations over which they may not have been measured at all. Gehlert and
colleagues borrow links from several research contexts to fill in the black box between
neighborhood and tumorigenesis.
Filling in the black box between the social environment and cancer incidence does not
justify an expectation that the relationship between them will be stable. It does not even
tell us anything reliable about how stable we might expect it to be. Instead, it may lead us
to attribute wishful intelligibility to a social epidemiological cause where it is lacking, and
to misrepresent the limits of (and risks entailed by) this explanation as a potential basis for
public health policy.
4.2 Integration, Stability, and Translation
One might object that the issue in this and similar cases is that we really ought to have
something stronger (or at least better confirmed) in mind with regard to filling in black
boxes (see Illari 2011). However, attention to the specific features of integration that might
justify estimations of stability in such cases is notoriously absent from the
Russo-Williamson account and from other arguments for filling in black boxes (Illari 2011;
Plutynski 2018). We can have good evidence for each link in a causal chain and yet have
relatively little evidence that these links are stable over some shared set of relevant
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background conditions (see Broadbent 2011). It is much more difficult to integrate evidence
from diverse contexts to show that each link in a chain is stable with regard to the same
conditions of interest than it is to justify inferences about individual links in a chain. Thus,
assessing the stability of a causal chain can come apart from (and be more burdensome
than) merely providing evidence of a causal chain, or providing evidence of individual links.
Importantly, this does not mean that we ought to be pessimistic about multilevel causal
models or about the so-called ‘social determinants of health’ more broadly. Rather, it
presents an opportunity to negotiate what does make for better and worse attributions of
stability. At a minimum, we might expect that coordination among researchers to improve
standardization and co-measurement of causal variables and background conditions,
together with explicit evaluation and justification of background assumptions across a
causal chain, would improve integration and inferences about the stability of a causal
relationship. Many translational epidemiologists have recently turned their attention to
these and other related features of knowledge integration in epidemiology with the goal of
improving and expediting the translation of biomedical research into public health
interventions (e.g. Ioannidis et al. 2013).
Following O’Malley and Stotz (2011) and others, I take it that the details of successful
knowledge integration in epidemiology will be largely pragmatic and contextually specific,
and most importantly that they will admit of degrees. My main concern is that the wishful
intelligibility of filling in black boxes leads us to overlook these considerations entirely. In
section 5, I argue that black boxes may prevent this sort of oversight in some contexts by
preserving epistemic humility about epidemiological causes.
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5 Preferring Black Boxes
So far, I have focused on the extent to which filling in black boxes may confer pragmatic
intelligibility, by way of stability. Now, I will consider the relationship between
intelligibility and black boxes themselves.
Previous endorsements of black boxed explanations in epidemiology have focused on the
utility of black boxes in designing interventions despite ignorance of intermediate links in a
causal chain (Cranor 2017; Plutynski 2018). These accounts often appeal to some version
of the argument from inductive risk, on which, broadly speaking, the ethical consequences
of error play a normative role in determining the amount and kind of evidence necessary to
justify accepting or rejecting a hypothesis, and, by extension, the decision to intervene in a
particular way (Douglas 2000; Steel 2016). They purport to justify a preference for (or
more accurately, a tolerance of) black boxes when the costs of agnosticism or inaction
outweigh the possible negative consequences of ignorance about the intermediate steps
between some putative C and E, or when the costs of providing evidence for a plausible set
of intermediate steps are too high, given the projected benefit of additional detail.
While I am sympathetic to these accounts, I am concerned to show that, by the same
token of inductive risk, there are circumstances in which we ought to prefer black boxed
explanations not despite, but because of their lack of information about causal
intermediates. This is because black boxes can prevent wishful intelligibility, especially
where stability is concerned. Imagine a case in which misjudging the stability of a cause
can be expected to have serious consequences for the success of some possible intervention.
Since filling in a black box can actively mislead us with respect to the stability of a cause,
we may prefer a black box for purposes of designing such an intervention. Wishful
intelligibility often has a price.
The above discussion of stability can help to predict the contexts in which we might be
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particularly susceptible to these mistakes. In cases where we have reason to expect a
complex or nonspecific, multi-causal structure, we might be misled by estimating stability
from a single causal chain. Further, I have argued that piecemeal causal inference (and
especially multilevel piecemeal causal inference) may lead us to overestimate the stability
of a causal chain, especially when links in the chain are poorly integrated. In both cases,
black boxed explanations capture and convey an appropriate sense of uncertainty about
the stability of some cause. In such cases, agnosticism about the stability of a cause may
be more conducive to the design of effective interventions than wishful intelligibility would
be. In this sense, my argument is concordant with Trout’s (2002, 212) condemnation of the
risks of “counterfeit understanding.” Admittedly, the value of black boxes in these cases is
indexed to the costs of being wrong about stability. However, given that stability is lauded
as a critical determinant of which epidemiological causes make for good interventions, I
take it that these concerns are relevant to a non-trivial number of cases.
Black boxes may thus preserve a certain humility, akin to what Pickersgill (2016) calls
“epistemic modesty” about the stability of a cause that is conducive to the design of good
interventions and the avoidance of bad ones. This means that black boxes are not merely
to be preferred despite the risk of unknown intermediates. Rather, a black box is preferable
to evidence of a causal chain in cases where the consequences of error about stability are
sufficiently undesirable. When we have thorough and well-integrated knowledge of a causal
structure, my concerns about under- and overestimating stability are less troubling. Given
that the appropriateness of black boxes (and of filling in) is contextual and specific, these
considerations put black boxes on par with evidence of intermediate linking causes as
features of explanations that may contribute to their pragmatic intelligibility in a
contextual and contingent manner.
Of course, this does not mean that black boxes are to be preferred to information about
intermediate causes in all or even most epidemiological explanations. The problem lies not
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with information about intermediate causes, but with the inferences we are tempted to
make about stability on the basis of this information. Furthermore, I have by no means
exhausted the arguments for filling in black boxes in epidemiological explanation, and I
expect we may have good reasons to prefer filling-in that outweigh these concerns about
stability in some contexts. Rather, my argument shows that black boxes deserve the same
status of contextual relevance to pragmatic intelligibility as do other features of
epidemiological explanations, not despite, but because of, the absence of information about
intermediate causes. This means that their inclusion (or filling-in) should be a matter of
transparent negotiation and justification, rather than a default preference one way or the
other.
6 Conclusions
Wishful intelligibility is a helpful diagnosis for the mistaken expectation that filling in black
boxes is a good guide to causal stability. Filling in black boxes is by no means the only
possible source of wishful intelligibility in epidemiology or elsewhere, nor does it always
have this effect. Rather, I have been concerned to argue about specific epidemiological
cases precisely because the features of an explanation that make it conducive to some
particular goal are contextual and specific. Similarly, I have shown that there is a positive
role for black boxes in preventing wishful intelligibility and in preserving epistemic humility
about the stability of complex causes in some cases of interest to epidemiologists.
These cases seem to have something in common; namely, incomplete, limited, or poorly
integrated knowledge of a complex causal structure. We might worry that my account
could mistakenly preclude a positive and epistemically responsible role(s) for various
departures from the whole truth (a` la Elgin 2007) or that a preference for black boxes in
such contexts perpetuates a harmful role for “ideal science” which may cripple important
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regulation and delay helpful interventions (Cranor 2017). But such a preference does not
depend on a false dichotomy between ideal science and wishful intelligibility; after all, black
boxes are themselves departures from the whole truth. Incomplete or poorly integrated
information about a complex causal structure need not paralyze the design of public health
interventions; it merely makes our assessments of stability a matter of second-order
inductive risk. My account invites transparency and justification for such decisions on a
case-by-case basis, and recommends specific ways in which the state of current
epidemiological knowledge should inform these considerations. To the extent that these
measures avoid wishful intelligibility, they make for more trustworthy reasons to intervene
in a particular way, not less.
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